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1 — Foreword by Patrick McKenna  
Acknowledgements
2 — Executive Summary 
2.1 — About the Research
This research explores the complex, multifaceted and 
contested subject of risk in the film business. The context 
is predominantly the UK independent film sector, although 
this is linked to, and affected by, the activity of major 
media companies, the international marketplace and other 
audiovisual sectors such as high-end television (HETV).
How risk is understood and managed in the film industry has 
a substantial impact upon which films are financed, produced 
and seen. Risk can therefore have dramatic implications on the 
impact of film – as a public good in its ability to help us engage 
with the world and each other 1, and with regard to economic 
returns for individuals and companies involved in film-making.
The research has examined the technical methods, 
experience-driven practices and business structures by which 
practitioners and the sector overall understand and manage 
specific sources of risk and broader industry uncertainties. 
Research methods used include, primarily, analysis of 
consultations with over 40 high-level film industry professionals 
from across the film value chain 2 (the sequential sub-
sectors, including production, distribution and exhibition 
– hereafter referred to as the FVC), and consultations with 
three world-leading academics. Participation was voluntary 
and anonymity offered for interviewees in order to access 
the richest information. The insights of these experts 
were analysed alongside any data or demonstrations 
that they provided. In addition, at the secondary level, 
some 300 documents were analysed, including company 
literature, academic research and industry reports.
This document represents a condensed  
version of the full research project. Further  
bibliographical and methodological detail  
is available digitally at www.filmriskresearch.com,  
along with information on future publications. 
2.2 — Context 
As evidenced by the announcement of the recent industrial 
strategy sector deal from HM Government 3, the creative 
industries are of key economic and strategic importance. 
The UK film industry is a flagship for, and crucial component 
of, the creative industries, and is internationally recognised 
as one of the world’s best places for film-making 4. However, 
there are pressing market and financial challenges to the 
independent sector which are inextricably intertwined with 
the film industry overall 5. These challenges include business 
model development and access to finance, areas in which 
the understanding of risk is fundamentally important.
Risk in the film industry is a pervasive and complex concept, 
predominantly associated with the potential for financial loss or 
reward, and composed of multiple, deeply interrelated sources 
across the creative and business elements of the value chain.
Understanding risk and its management is key to building 
the sector and attracting investment – and a key issue 
therefore for policy-makers and industry support agencies. 
The director Stephen Frears once observed that “the true 
heroes of films are the investors. They take the risk, after all.” 
The heroism bit may be a little overstated, but Stephen is right 
about the importance of risk-taking to the film industry.
The activities of production companies, in film as in music and 
other content genres, rest on a complex and unpredictable 
relationship to the market. There is sometimes a tremendous 
public demand for their products, the ‘hits’ on which the industry 
depends. But, critically, these activities are what I call ‘non 
demand-led’ in the sense that no market research has any useful 
predictive value as regards ultimate box office performance. 
Producers, more even than sales agents and distributors, 
occupy the high end of the spectrum of business risk. 
However, and this is the key point, business risk in media content 
companies can be overcome if you have the market knowledge, 
the capital and the commercial skills to manage it. Michael 
Franklin’s research findings will come as no surprise to those 
of us who have worked in the business for as long as I have. 
Sadly however, a deep understanding of the risks involved in 
making and distributing film, and by implication of the steps 
required to succeed in this business, is comparatively rare.
I hope that Michael’s work will help to move the agenda forward 
by sharing an advanced understanding of the opportunities 
and challenges ahead. If it succeeds in this ambition I 
shall be glad to have played a part by supporting him.
Patrick McKenna  
Founder of the Ingenious Group, Chairman of the Institute for 
Creative and Cultural Entrepreneurship (ICCE) Advisory Board 
and Chairman of the National Film and Television School (NFTS).
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2.3 — Key Findings
 — There is poor information provision concerning 
risk in the film business and a knowledge gap has 
developed as a result. This has negative implications 
for industry practitioners, policy-makers and 
policy innovation. This knowledge gap adversely 
affects access to finance, the development of 
new business models and the wider diffusion of 
commercial best practice throughout the industry.
 — This problem stems from the multiple and sometimes 
contradictory understanding of, and responses to, 
risk across project, business and market environment 
contexts. Poor information availability and lack of clear 
understanding infects much general commentary on the 
state of the industry with the consequence that much of 
it is lacking in insight and commercial awareness and the 
nature of film industry risk characteristics is obscured. 
 — The use of data-oriented approaches for specific, 
bounded tasks is under-explored, especially within the 
independent sector. This is partly due to incomplete 
understanding of risk concepts, which blurs 
complex distinctions between reverse engineering 
(attempting to replicate past successes) and derived 
demand 6 (demand based on an intermediary’s 
requirements, not the end user). Inadequate resources 
for accessing data-driven techniques means that 
companies are unable to benefit from all potentially 
available insights into business-relevant risks.
 — To account for its complexity, risk in the film business is 
usefully considered in relation to the following themes: 
 – Extended processes: the ongoing core 
film-making activity with risk management 
implicitly embedded e.g. development 
conversion, project access and selection;
 – Industry tools and approaches to project and market 
analysis: the specific devices that help to organise 
and mobilise the value chain e.g. revenue forecast 
ultimates, sales estimates, and finance plans;
 – Conditions of interpretation: the motivations, 
rationalisations and impacts of organisational 
/ national industry cultures; and
 – Business structures: integrated models, cross-
FVC boundary alignment and negotiated 
balance of power arrangements. 
This analytical approach helps to show that risk is generally 
framed, or even intuited, rather than calculated, and that 
this process occurs across a sliding scale of formality.
2.4 — Conclusion, Recommendation and 
Proposals for Future Work 
The picture that emerges from this research is of a sector 
which is largely impenetrable to outsiders and sometimes a 
mystery even to itself. Risk is universally acknowledged but is 
insufficiently understood or rationally differentiated within the 
industry. Endemic sector under-capitalisation is lamented and 
taken as a given, but there is little evidence of active, consistent 
consideration being given by practitioners and policy-makers 
to addressing its causes. Based on the views expressed by 
respondents in this study a main reason for under-capitalisation 
and consequential systemic commercial fragility seems clear: 
too little dependable information and, much more important, too 
little widely diffused sector knowledge in the sense of developed 
business skills and shared commercial understanding.
A number of proposals for future work, plus a single 
enabling recommendation, emerge from the analysis 
presented in this report. The overall conclusion of this 
research is that long-term positive change and sector 
reinvigoration in the UK film industry may be possible, but is 
highly conditional. There is no ‘silver bullet’, but one crucial 
requirement for releasing the sector’s potential is greater 
data transparency. The greatly increased strategic use of 
information is a necessary if not a sufficient condition for 
maximising industry returns from UK creativity in film. 
What is required is the development of new, coherent 
mechanisms for collecting, processing and disseminating 
industry data so that, subject to genuine considerations of 
commercial sensitivity, the benefits of such data become 
accessible to all businesses operating across the FVC. 
To be clear, this is not a recommendation for attempting 
simplistic reverse engineering of success from historic 
data, but for building and opening up datasets from 
(largely) existing but currently inaccessible repositories of 
information to help inform business decision-making.
The most persuasive approach to addressing the requirement 
for better information will require the creation of a new, 
institutionally accredited and appropriately supported industry 
resource designed to enable state-of-the-art data collection 
and dissemination and promote best practice in its commercial 
use. This resource would be established under the governance 
of industry trade bodies, accounting professionals and other 
industry stakeholders. Amongst other things this vehicle for 
applied analysis would undertake the urgent examination 
of technologically-enabled approaches to risk mitigation, 
including applications of blockchain technology. It would enable 
multiple routes of engagement with industry data and also 
address integration with EU and wider international initiatives.
Recommendation: an industry stakeholder group should be 
convened by the film industry team at the Department for Digital, 
Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) to make this happen. Clearly 
the specification and set-up of this resource would be a large 
undertaking and require extensive feasibility and administrative 
work and strong industry leadership. There might be a role for 
the new Policy and Evidence Centre (PEC), funded and currently 
being established by the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AHRC) under the rubric of the Government’s Industrial Strategy 
Challenge Fund as part of the recently announced sector deal 
for the creative industries. The instrumental arrangements 
for implementing this recommendation are for discussion.
The new body should specify the measures required 
to deliver the following outcomes and make 
recommendations as to optimal delivery: 
 — The institutional accreditation of industry information 
and data so as to promote greater transparency 
and investor confidence in the sector; 
 — The enabling of appropriately-resourced sector  
data analysis;
 — The consolidation and dissemination of information about 
best practice in film industry accounting standards; and
 — The provision of leadership and guidance on the 
use of technology-based approaches to risk issues 
including blockchain architecture and shared and 
anonymised computation, to facilitate better industry 
understanding in areas such as audience analysis.
In addition, two further proposals for detailed work 
have emerged and should be placed on the industry’s 
agenda, although both are more complex and possibly 
more contested than those outlined above: 
 — The examination of enhanced research and 
development (R&D) support options for content 
businesses throughout the wider creative economy, 
including exploration of tax-advantaged models; and 
 — The investigation of a deeper policy focus 
on developing support for domestic content 
businesses associated with inward investment 
flows and related industry infrastructure.
This is an ambitious programme by any standards and, to 
repeat, there is room for debate about the mechanisms for 
establishing the new body, its governance, precise terms of 
reference and remit. However, with the future of UK independent 
film at stake it is to be hoped that an early consensus might 
be reached as to how best to execute this recommendation.
2.5 — Structure of the Rest of the Document 
Following an introduction to the research process 
(Section 3), the findings in this document are presented 
in four main sections, although these areas of enquiry 
exhibit many interlinking threads. They are:
 — Framing the Problem: Multiple and Imprecise 
Diagnoses of Risk (Section 4). This explores the issue 
of the varied and imprecise understanding of risk and 
contextualises the concept in relation to the FVC; 
 — Current Practice: Industry Responses to Risk 
(Section 5). This examines current approaches 
to understanding and managing risk. Three sub-
sections explore: approaches and practices in 
relation to risk, including development and project 
selection; the function of industry tool-kits and 
analyses, such as budgets, finance plans and sales 
estimates; and business motivations and structures;
 — Market Environment Uncertainty: Future-Oriented 
and Macro-Level Considerations (Section 6). This 
shifts the analysis from specific risks to wider concerns 
about the market and its future development; and 
 — Findings and Proposals (Section 7). This final 
section introduces proposals including data and 
technology-led approaches, regulation and public 
intervention, integrated support initiatives, financial 
instruments and evidence-based policy-making.
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3.1 — Overview 
Risk is a critical issue for the film industry as whole, 
both creatively and economically. Risk is a very 
broad topic and it pervades the business. Complex 
issues of conceptual knowledge impact how the 
film industry is perceived and how it operates. 
There are multiple approaches to understanding, describing 
and managing risk in the film business. This is not necessarily a 
conscious issue for all top-level market participants – the leading 
companies and individuals of the kind interviewed for this 
research. Successful practitioners have developed sophisticated 
understandings and insightful management strategies to 
deal with their current needs, as per their particular business 
model. However, a lack of consistency in conceptualisation 
and terminology in relation to risk adds to confusion in 
industry and policy documentation and can negatively 
impact broader practice. The literature includes unhelpful 
descriptions of film as both especially risky and no more risky 
than other industries 7. It also conflates film with other creative 
industries. Hard and fast designations of whole industries fail 
to explain the nuances at play, resulting in the retention of 
stereotypical, broad brush and opaque conceptions of risk 
within and without the independent film sector. This means 
that longstanding problems, such as demonstrating business 
value and attracting investment, are not addressed coherently.
Against this backdrop, research was undertaken with the 
objective to provide a rigorous synthesis of professional 
expertise, industry practice and multi-disciplinary academic 
research on the film industry: “a business context surrounded 
by ambiguity, risk and uncertainty” 8 whose characteristics are 
rarely separated out and explored in detail. The field is often 
subject either to broad characterisation as part of the creative 
industries, or viewed narrowly through the lens of theatrical box 
office modelling. This study addresses the topic using a more 
rounded approach that recognises the many interrelations 
and inter-dependencies that characterise the film industry. 
The perspectives and actions of different kinds of market 
participants are important. The tacit and explicit identification, 
evaluation, assessment, communication, materialisation (placing 
in technical tool-sets) and mitigation of risk all feature highly. 
Three interwoven industry problems are especially pertinent: 
1. A lack of clarity, precision and cohesion in 
analyses addressing risk in the film industry;
2. The weak corporate finances of UK film companies; and
3. The persistent inability of film production 
companies to retain benefits from the successful 
exploitation of intellectual property (IP). 
This research finds the first problem to be an under-appreciated 
cause of the second and third. An improved understanding 
of the management of risk, in all of its component parts and 
multiple dimensions, has the potential to engender greater 
economic and cultural returns. Such outcomes may result 
from increased investment in the sector based on a clearer 
appreciation of its particularities, and improved recoupment 
options for IP creators based on wider financing options such 
as those potentially generated by policy initiatives that increase 
R&D support. These are intrinsically linked to improvements 
in corporate finance and thus business sustainability.
One critical, core research question arises: what are the 
reasons for the persistently poor understanding of risk and risk 
management in the film business, and what can be done to 
improve the overall operating environment? There are some 
general and some specific reasons, some fundamental and 
some circumstantial. At the heart is the nature of risk in film as 
a product and a (twofold) industrial / organisational response. 
The high sunk costs and unpredictable returns of film 9 have 
resulted in the independent system segmenting responsibility 
for costs and rewards across a sequential chain in which the 
producers, who are furthest from the audience, and have the 
slowest mode of operation, generally suffer greatest negative 
balance of power and thus financial detriment. Examining this 
market structure and associated market behaviour provides 
a window into the ways in which risk influences practice 10. 
3.2 — Study Parameters
Although this research is mainly concerned with the film 
industry in the UK and with issues impacting independent 
film companies, film is international and is linked to, and 
impacted by, the activities of major media companies, 
the international marketplace and other audiovisual 
sectors, especially high-end television (HETV).
Further sources of uncertainty not conceived at the time of 
planning in 2015 emerged during the course of research in 2016-
17, notably Brexit and the timing of new European regulation 
on copyright and the digital single market. However, their 
implications are yet to be determined. Thus, while these ‘external’ 
issues are taken into account, the intrinsic understanding and 
management of risk in the film business remained the focus. 
This research does not aim to provide an introductory 
text to issues well covered elsewhere 11, but to introduce 
an analytical framework within which professionals 
may consider their own risk-related practices.
In addition to these boundaries, it is also important to 
recognise that there are significant limitations imposed by 
the data available. For example, in its 2017 study on The 
State of the UK Independent Film Sector, Olsberg•SPI noted 
the dearth of information on sources of UK film finance: 
“One issue for this study was the lack of data on financing 
sources and finance plans, and changes over the timeframe...
Unlike countries such as France and Sweden, the UK does 
not publish annual data on key sources of film finance.” 12 
Whilst this research benefited greatly from the generosity of 
many public and private market participants, there remains 
a widespread problem in accessing film finance information. 
In some cases, public agencies that do collect information 
lack the resources to maximise analysis in-house and do 
not outsource such work due to perceived confidentiality 
concerns. This state of affairs informs a key finding of this 
research, a perspective that also informs a 2017 call for action 
from the European Film Agency Directors (EFADs): “EFADs 
will work strategically to ensure transparent access to film and 
audience data across the whole value chain… First, authors and 
right holders should always have access to the quantitative 
data on the full exploitation of their work and data on all 
publicly funded works must be made available to the funds, 
through legal mandates if necessary. Second, film agencies 
will increase their collaboration to share quantitative and 
qualitative data, analysis on audiences and initiate new studies.” 13 
This action is imperative at a time of potentially increased 
separation from international partners following Brexit.
3 — Motivations, Objectives and Approach
This section provides an introduction to the issue of understanding and 
managing risk in the film industry and gives an outline of the research approach. 
Suffragette, 2015, directed by Sarah Gavron, 
produced by Alison Owen and Faye Ward.
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4.1 — Overview 
“It doesn’t really work as a business as most businesses would. 
That comes back to the fact of how risky each film is.”
There is a general consensus, conferred by the press and 
supported by policy documents, industry commentary and 
market behaviour, that the creative industries are risky and film 
particularly so. A narrower band of literature proposes counter 
arguments that film is no more risky than any other business 
or industry sub-sector. There is an overall lack of depth, clarity 
and coherence in the wider understanding of the subject. 
This starts with confusion over the concept of risk itself. It 
includes a lack of detailed recognition over the sources, types, 
levels, layers, combinations and volume of risk, as well as the 
implications of, and responses to, these aspects. The general 
proposition is reflected in this statement: “to reiterate the 
riskiness of the film business is moot, very little in the way of a 
coherent picture on the nature of risk has been presented.” 14 
Many components of the topic often go altogether under-
acknowledged. It is therefore essential to work towards 
greater clarity, for example addressing why films may have 
different financial risk categorisations and outcomes for 
different participants, and why “risk and reward can only 
themselves be understood effectively in differential terms – 
dependent upon one’s position within and interaction with the 
norms, machinations and power plays” 15 of the business. 
Oversimplifications and partial understanding of this subject 
can be damaging. Blanket descriptions of film as very risky 
are off-putting to potential investors. However, it is also 
the case that simplistic counter-assertions that film is no 
more risky than other business sectors, and which do not 
adequately represent film’s real and specific risks, can lead 
to the swift undermining of unrealistic expectations. The 
ability of the industry to support businesses and livelihoods 
based on new successes is undermined by the lack of long-
term, informed financial backing. For film to flourish, for it 
to survive even, it requires financial support. That support 
is likely only to be forthcoming on a consistent basis if it is 
knowledgeably informed. Potential support is hamstrung 
without a true and well-rounded appreciation of risk. 
4.2 — Starting Principles: Uncertain 
Demand, Risk and Reward
There is a multiplicity of risk types and understandings of 
risk 16. The dominant or underlying risk for consideration 
in film, often implicitly recognised, is the risk of whether a 
film generates sufficient revenue so as not to lose money 
and provide a return on investment (ROI) to participants 17. 
This fundamental conception of risk necessarily includes 
creative valuation components. The risk-reward relationship 
is intrinsically and intricately related to a variety of 
contributory types of risk and correlative management 
practices, such as overall commercial perspective, talent 
reputation, conditions of reception and other variables. 
However, the starting point is always consumer demand 
uncertainty – whether an audience will pay to see the film. 
The global film industry has developed myriad strategies for 
minimising exposure to demand uncertainty, balancing them 
with strategies for capitalising on unlimited upside potential. 
The motivation to become involved with a film (via production, 
distribution, investment) is usually (though not always) to extract 
exceptional earnings from a hit. Once production, distribution 
and other costs are covered, returns can be exceptional 18. 
However, access to returns depends completely on participation 
specifics. Whilst an equity participant will continue to earn 
indefinitely from a hit over the course of a film’s life cycle, the 
more protected debt positions – secured against tax incentives 
or pre-sales – are less risky but without extended benefits. Risk 
is indivisible from the concomitant opportunity for reward, 
but the details of the many complex commercial responses to 
managing uncertainty are under-explored in industry literature.
4.3 — The Nature of Risk and Uncertainty
A key issue of language hampers much industry expression. 
Risk and uncertainty are different concepts: “Risk…is a 
calculation and is relatively known (cost benefit analysis)... 
In uncertainty, outcomes and possibilities are unknown. 
Uncertainty is a common feature in industries relying heavily 
on copyright. In the creative industries, where the copyright 
for creative content is important, there is great uncertainty 
about the success of any particular work; predicting how well 
a book or television programme will fare is difficult.” 19 There 
is a misperception that because much ‘risk’ in film escapes 
rational, probabilistic calculation and thus constitutes extreme 
uncertainty on some definitions 20, measures of mitigation 
are ineffectual. This is why the context of risk-taking is 
crucial: attention has to be paid to the processes, tools or 
devices being deployed, and conditions of interpretation.
Even within notions of calculable risk, there are variants. These 
range from future event likelihoods to the standard deviation 
of expected portfolio returns 21, and from general abstract 
financial magnitudes to sector specific prediction methods 
characterised in some research as a “statistical divination rod 
to predict box office ‘blockbusters’.” 22 As well as identifying the 
specific understanding and linked methods being applied in 
any given case, it is important to map them to the underlying 
assumptions. Some approaches to risk are only rational when 
seen from the subjective position of the market participant: 
“Often measures and management processes are only useful 
once over-riding issues have been accepted e.g. accepting that 
extrapolation of past events is a good guide to the future” 23. As if 
to illustrate film industry complexity, this particular acceptance 
(past indicates future), as research has shown 24, both informs 
current practice but is also criticised reflexively as unreliable.
The importance of specifically framing the understanding of 
risk becomes increasingly apparent when further definitional 
components are considered. As noted earlier, the primary risk 
in film is often considered to be losing money, or not achieving 
sufficient return. Limitations to measurement are contextualised 
in particular ways of thinking: “The risk is due to the uncertainty 
regarding future events and their effects in terms of revenues 
generated by a given project. The risk, therefore, can produce 
positive or negative effects by increasing or decreasing future 
revenues. A rational investor will try to measure ex ante the 
level of risk of a given investment, in order to assess whether 
to invest or not and at what price. Therefore, the risk has two 
dimensions: the ‘expected component’, that the rational investor 
expects and incorporates in its decision, and the ‘unexpected 
component’, that cannot be forecasted.” 25 In this articulation, 
conditions of complete calculability are replaced by distinctions 
between specific instances and general conditions. There 
are elements that can be forecast to some degree, and 
elements of business that cannot. This kind of assessment 
can inform where companies with limited resources allocate 
time and effort, addressing where a difference can definitely 
be made, and where it is worth pursuing more information. 
This process of the detailed unpicking of risk components, 
which is often not explicitly articulated as risk mitigation in 
practice, is typically absent from policy and industry literature.
Risk management processes have both individual and 
organisational characteristics: “risk is social, and to 
understand the culture of risk, we need to understand the 
wider cultural and political factors.” 26 They differ across 
the variety of market participants in the film industry, 
from owner-operator independent producers to major 
Studio departments dealing with slates across multiple 
territories. Cultures of risk perspective vary according to 
types of finance e.g. debt and equity, operational goals 
of organisations, and individuals and their careers. 
There are psychological aspects to risk mitigation and the 
development of strategic approaches that can be heavily 
influenced by organisational culture: “Traditional concepts of 
risk are also framed at the individual level. Loss is not perceived 
symmetrically with gain, and the magnitude of potential losses 
matters…Tolerance for risk increases after big gains and after 
losses when there is a chance to break even. Career risk may 
impact investment decisions for one investor very differently from 
that for another. Incentive structures and behaviour can vary 
and are thus important for understanding risk management and 
investment behaviour in practice.” 27 This variety is borne out by 
different research participants’ reactions to slate performance, 
to tolerance of deal term changes at closing, and to developing 
business models. There is an interweaving of risk considerations 
at individual, organisational / company and industrial levels.
Given the well-established use of ‘risk’ as such a broad term, 
it would be near impossible to instantiate a strict taxonomy of 
concepts according to definitional differentiations between 
risk and uncertainty. However, moving towards more 
situational readings of risk is both viable and necessary.
4.4 — Risk is Required, Risk is Good?
Beyond investment and creative circles, risk is typically 
considered in terms of harm and hazard. A negative connotation 
similarly taints the broader condition of uncertainty: “In general, 
uncertainty is not a good thing for firms or economies as it may 
result in wasteful avoidance behaviour… Risk is less of a problem, 
as being quantifiable, it allows firms to adopt risk management 
strategies.” 28 In this formulation, the creative industries have 
uncertainty as a common characteristic. This presents a 
challenge for considering the calculative work both of downside 
protection against risk and potential upside measurement. 
How can the definition of risk as a “relatively known” 29 state of 
affairs apply to different risk sources in film-making processes 
across the FVC, and still allow for coherent sector analysis? 
There is a need to account for the positive potential outcome 
of risk. An important link stands between the “artist or creative 
and the entrepreneur of classical economics”; both exist in 
an “environment of pervasive uncertainty” with “risk-taking 
central to their function – to the creative process and product, 
and the life of creative businesses / endeavours.” 30 There is 
a productive role to risk that emerges when risk as a hazard 
to be avoided is put in conversation with other elements, 
most importantly the positive upside it can unlock. This can 
create a more balanced perspective and has been used 
to argue that: “risk-taking in CIS [creative industries] policy 
should be informed by skill and sense and be managed, but 
not avoided” 31. This approach “decouples risk from uncertainty 
and looks at risk in relation to return in a trade-off. Risk is 
typically defined as a measurable probability of an outcome, 
whereas uncertainty is immeasurable and unpredictable 
(Knight, 1921). Risk implies the possibility of calculated decisions 
based on statistical inference from past trends, opening up 
the possibility for systemic management.” 32 Some parts of 
the film industry do utilise such methodologies as inputs to 
their understanding and have applied the learning gained 
to market decisions. However, little evidence exists of such 
methods being taken up in strict formulations, or of information 
about their contextual application being widely shared.
4 — Framing the Problem: Multiple and 
Imprecise Diagnoses of Risk
This section provides insight into the reasons for a lack of 
understanding of risk in the film industry and the consequences. 
It also explores the differences between risk and uncertainty 
and issues around how industry structures relate to risk. 
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4.5 — Implications of Creative Industries’ 
Perceived Riskiness or Lack of Risk
How market participants view risk in relation to notions of 
chance, luck or control can substantially influence their strategic 
operations. The research literature contains debates over the 
implications of different levels of possible control: “Many cultural 
industries scholars assume that it is impossible to assess the 
success potential of any good in advance, and that it is purely 
a matter of luck. However, the existence of selectors suggests 
that they have some value, and some selectors perform better 
than others” 33. Rather than accepting that nothing can be known 
for certain, practitioners can and do learn from experience.
A repeatedly cited 2011 study focussing on the riskiness or 
otherwise of a wide spread of creative industries companies 
(not just film companies) articulated one perspective of 
non-engaging financiers: [the] “High St banks’ view: unless 
there is already a revenue stream, we just won’t invest at 
all…. If creative businesses have a viable business plan with 
predictable revenues…[they] may present an opportunity. 
It also presents a risk; given that a creative business 
depends on an asset that exists inside the entrepreneur’s 
brain, banks are unable to secure their investment against 
it.” 34 Film does exhibit inherent characteristics that a wide 
variety of academic disciplines and industry benchmarks 
denote as risky 35 on any definition. However, because the 
term is subjective and also relative, judgments of more or 
less risk depend on the definitions and methodologies of 
accounting for riskiness, which are often highly specialised. 
The traditional finance sector is often acknowledged to lack 
such detailed expertise regarding the film industry 36.
4.6 — Organisation of Industry Structure 
and Derived Demand
It can be argued that the independent film sector is organised 
according to the segmenting of risk and return for each 
project across the FVC. Producers are largely responsible for 
developing and delivering a film project, and in return typically 
stand to earn a producer fee, although this fee can be subject 
to pressure. Meanwhile, sales and distribution companies can 
put up significant sums to make production occur. Companies 
put up additional capital as more becomes known about a 
project over time. The framing of uncertainty narrows: ambiguity 
becomes more tolerable. This generally results in an uneven 
distribution of risk across different sub-sectors as participants 
join at different times, with widely varying costs of involvement. 
It should be noted that risk and return are often asymmetrically 
aligned, and they do not necessarily alter in parallel. Crucial 
last minute tranches of finance may be able to extract rights to 
outsize potential returns in their favour, illustrating the dynamic 
commercial environment in which risk valuations are made.
The FVC is an evolved structural attempt to insulate participants, 
as far as possible, against consumer demand uncertainty. 
Financiers are more likely to back a film if they believe it can be 
sold to distributors around the world, or to video-on-demand 
(VOD) service providers. Thus, in making decisions, investors and 
fund managers are not solely considering audience demand, 
but rather derived demand – the demand from broadcasters, 
theatrical distributors, VOD services and other business-to-
business buyers of content. These market participants are 
more predictable than theatrical audiences informing the 
behaviour of producers, one notes: “As a producer, my market 
is the initial financing of the film, which is not a good situation, 
because it means I am not actually dealing with my real 
market.” This reliance on networked systems of intermediaries 
and their own internal valuation mechanisms not only places 
producers at a remove from their audience but complicates the 
application of any heralded transparency of audience data. 
Companies in the film industry may therefore operate on a 
basis that cannot be accounted for by rational probabilistic 
risk analysis of their final market. However, so long as there 
are common understandings of evaluations between buyers 
and sellers, the conventions hold up. Considered from the 
perspective of inter-subjective rationality (if something is 
rational to the transacting parties it need not be objectively 
rational), the practice of operating project by project on 
the basis of trusted relationships and making decisions 
according to track record is strategically valid even if it 
seems highly risky to outsiders. Whilst proving untenable for 
many companies long-term, the overall observance of the 
FVC’s parcelling out of risk has become the classic overall 
sector-level model – a model which some participants 
conceptualise as a kind of virtual national independent studio. 
These FVC-grounded risk management strategies are 
of a different order to the probabilistic evaluation of risk 
regarding box office performance. However, they have 
become somewhat formulaic, or at least regularised 
and familiar, through the use of standard industry tools 
such as sales estimates sheets and other devices. 
5 — Current Practice: Industry  
Responses to Risk
Driven by the potential for projects to reach a substantial audience and by the 
need to protect against the risk of insufficient returns, the film business utilises 
a wide range of interlinked risk management practices. This section surveys 
the nature of risk understandings at the interactive boundaries between 
FVC segments and considers how this impacts on the life of a film project. 
5.1 — Thought Processes and Practices
“It is not very scientific”: “It’s not a science”: 
“It is no particular science”
5.1.1 — Non-Scientific Approaches
Many respondents enthusiastically designated the use of 
particular devices, e.g. revenue forecasting models, as explicitly 
non-scientific. This reflects their understanding that the 
combined context of ultimate demand uncertainty and their 
own conditions of decision-making render pure probabilistic 
approaches inapplicable. Their strategic response to uncertainty 
is adherence to well-established and familiar means to protect 
against losses, specific to the particularities of their involvement. 
Most forward-looking or predictive activity is characterised 
as low-level science, or quasi-scientific, and only moderately 
reliable at best. Market participants noted as using scientific 
terms at the financing stage are generally considered to be the 
most market-integrated investors, for example sales agents who 
propose such black-box formulae as ‘X casting equals Y budget’. 
Research participants foregrounded the role of experience, 
trusted partners, and the ability to capitalise on opportunity 
as key approaches to managing risk. The use of graduated 
and longitudinal practices such as reliance on multi-party 
finance, or financiers’ deployment of a spectrum of nuanced 
instruments (e.g. discounting tax credits, pre-sales and equity 
involvement), rather than relying on probabilistic approaches 
to risk mitigation, is rarely examined anywhere. Deal structure 
specifics that determine potential for participant reward are 
separate to, but interlinked with, the chances of a particular 
film’s performance in primary and secondary markets. Together 
they determine total project involvement risk. Yet these market 
features attract far less attention than headline box office 
variance and memorable aphorisms about unknowability.
One unintended implication of non-participants’ lack of detailed 
knowledge of business risk profiles is that they can infer 
rejection of statistical approaches at one stage in the film life 
cycle to signify a lack of validity in their application in others, for 
example specialist audience segmentation and marketing. A 
generalised dismissal of the application of quantitative insights 
is shared by some producers and funders. The unknowability 
of ultimate consumer demand and of the potential for investor 
upside are much more well-known characteristics of the 
industry than the detailed practices used to engage with them.
5.1.2 — Development: Casting and Conversion
The primary risk encountered by a production company is 
that it does not get its films into production, thereby earning 
fees, and is forced out of business. Thus, substantial time 
and effort is allocated to bringing projects into fruition. There 
are a wide variety of approaches for pursuing conversion 
from development to production, depending on the type 
of companies involved, their scale, business model and so 
on. Addressing development risk is a complex endeavour. 
In addition to the driving motivation to make the best film 
possible from a creative perspective, is the need to offload 
the costs of production through the FVC by all possible 
means. A key example is encapsulated in the role of casting, 
which demonstrates the instrumental role of many valuation 
processes. The practice of pursuing ‘bankable’ talent and 
using the resulting sales estimates to facilitate (unverifiable) 
derived demand calculations aimed at closing financing and 
generating fees, illustrates how deeply risk management 
concerns are embedded in the activities of producers.
It is a truism that creativity in areas like script-writing, 
cinematography, acting and direction fundamentally influences 
the overall quality of a film. High-end creative inputs are 
intended to reduce risk of financial loss by generating work 
that audiences will enjoy and turn into a ‘hit’. The motivation 
here is self-evident and vast swathes of the literature deal with 
those fine-grained aspects of the cinematic art that may be 
classified as execution risk. This research does not deal with 
execution risk from a creative perspective. Rather, attention is 
focussed on the logics and tools by which tangible components 
of creative intent and creative expression are evaluated and 
commercially transacted. The framing of cast and crew as 
project assets with their attendant reputational capital, and 
the imprecise valuation of potential future work based on past 
creative achievements, are crucially important examples.
5.1.3 — Project Selection and Access
While producers select the films they wish to develop, and 
hopefully produce, through a mixture of creative passion, 
business insight and pragmatic considerations relating to project 
turnover, other market participants involved in film finance 
also have to make decisions about resource allocation. It is a 
combination of the risk assessments of different participants 
coming together that leads to production and release. 
Certain distinctions can be made to help understand when, how 
and by whom differently motivated evaluation processes are put 
to work in creating a film. The estimation of ultimate revenues 
for a proposed project is one such management procedure, 
the reference to comparable titles is another. Potential projects 
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are evaluated both in and of themselves and in comparison 
with competing projects. Potential projects are not all equal 
and nor are measures for their assessment. The potential for 
upside (profits) and downside (losses) are usually examined 
but are more of a concern for some participants than others.
In examining the respective perspectives and concerns 
of different market participants a number of themes 
emerged from the research. These themes express three 
widely shared beliefs as to current realities as follows: 
 — First, current market conditions, including digital 
disruption and the legacy of financial crises, have 
contributed to a generalised risk aversion and 
greater concentration on films containing certain 
‘high level’ elements, for example established 
talent and familiar IP. This has led to extreme 
competition for product in this market segment;
 — Second, revenue forecasting tool-sets are recognised 
but only as incomplete heuristics, with usage differing 
across FVC participants. Each participant sub-sector 
tends to over-rate the sophistication of others’ tools; and 
 — Third, a lack of consensus over the viability of comparable 
titles analysis, especially the timeliness of information, 
is evident, as with revenue prediction methodologies 
such as Monte Carlo simulations (probability models 
used for computing expected box office returns) 37.
5.1.4 — The Importance of Language 
The use of language in the industry tends to be mixed and at 
times confusing. This includes the acknowledgement of the 
lack of certainty, regular use of terms such as probability and 
likelihood, but also the practice of defining business operations 
against chance. While data relating to predicted revenues 
is clearly prized, decisions are often explicitly portrayed not 
as neutral calculations but as expressions of conservatism 
influenced by viewpoints based on experience. Such decisions 
are formed within commercial frameworks set up in a way 
that makes the market participant feel comfortable with their 
familiar business model. Interaction between environmental 
(market) considerations, timing of decisions and loss of 
control are all important, yet these factors are rarely explicit.
The phrase “we will take a view” is key: many interviewees 
repeated the phrase in different contexts. This phrase 
emphasises agency and reflects reasoned, informed evaluation 
in a space in which knowing a distinct, finite outcome is 
impossible – subjectivity is therefore explicitly required. These 
dynamics and their associated sector structure drive over-
inflated positivity in some FVC segments: “One of the big 
questions always in our business is how bullish people are about 
a particular project… and ultimately it [green-light decision-
making] does tend to be based on your optimism about a film.”
Managing risk is complicated by several factors including 
competition and differing goals and ambitions within and 
between companies. This makes it difficult to model the market. 
From a major Studio operations perspective, the project 
evaluation process can follow a condensed calculation across 
integrated FVC divisions. When projects are considered, the 
company “run numbers on it, which basically means a P’n’L 
[profit and loss account] under typically two or three scenarios. 
The scenarios will include a base case and then a low case and 
a high case.” The ability to do so with accuracy relies on their 
control of downstream ancillary exploitation such as TV. “At 
this point we have some idea what the cost of the film is, so we 
will plug that in, and then we will take a view on if this is a film 
we want to take a risk on.” For some companies, for certain 
films, due to the structure of their financial participation and/
or their arrangements downstream there may be little to no 
risk at all, for example when a financier discounts Film Tax 
Relief (FTR) and/or pre-sales. Indeed some producers view 
sales agents to be taking on zero risk, deeming that they 
already have secured downstream buyers. An understanding 
of how their potential partners view a project informs producer 
perspectives and the way in which they cross-calculate the 
approach of potential partners in sales and distribution.
5.1.5 — Analysis of Comparable Titles 
The performance risk of a given title is variable within 
structural and institutional norms. Thus, a distributor will be 
intensely involved in the creative risk of marketing, including 
the specialised execution of marketing spend. These 
components interact with such issues as audience access and 
willingness to pay. The latter set of concerns is partly softened 
by established practices of risk management across FVC 
boundary points. These include the contractual apportioning 
of risk on a film-by-film basis according to relationship 
precedents, for example sliding scales of revenue distribution 
contractually agreed amongst distributors, exhibitors, pay-
TV providers and so on. So, whilst there is project risk every 
time, there is an infrastructure that mediates the process.
The reliability of estimated returns for home entertainment 
revenues is considered particularly robust. This is especially 
the case for distributors who own or repeatedly use the same 
supply chain: “It is the most formulaic and quantitative part 
of our business, home entertainment, in the sense that you 
use comparative titles to put together an estimate of what 
you are going to do in the home entertainment window. 
You will only look at films that are really recent, the last two 
years, and then you model. You say well, the conversion 
of box office to home entertainment for certain titles is as 
follows, so you get a range. Once you know what the box 
office is, you can then get an estimate of what the home 
entertainment is … ultimately it’s just a guide: how many units 
should we be thinking we are going to sell.” This stepwise 
process thinking provides a framework for evaluation.
Cross collateralisation across exploitation windows and 
territories, and the increasing importance of an in-home 
window as a primary point of exploitation, are characteristics 
often considered intrinsic to larger companies’ balancing 
of risk and return. However, a willingness and ability to 
experiment, often assumed of large-scale traditional 
media companies by external commenters, appears to be 
overstated. This is partly because lead times, departmental 
silos and separation from audience decision-making in big 
conventional organisations make developing ‘best practice’ 
extremely hard and tend to discourage innovation. 
5.2 — Industry Tools and Approaches to 
Project and Market Analysis
The operation of the FVC is mediated by the use of several 
crucial industry tool-kits. These tools include budgets, sales 
estimates, production incentives, finance plans, recoupment 
charts, ultimates profit and loss accounts and digital 
engagement metrics. They are often run in parallel, facilitating 
interaction between participants in a kind of mediated 
shuttle diplomacy. These combine with strategies such as 
reliance on partner networks (to access projects, talent and 
information), and with structural arrangements dealing with 
the scale, timing and windows of distribution. Each of these 
elements has an impact on individual projects as they move 
through the film life cycle. Problems of understanding and 
communication arise from the lack of detail with which such 
tools are explained, specifically in relation to business models.
Examining a variety of business model approaches to risk in film, 
a running theme emerges of both the regular use of established 
tools, for example, profit and loss account modelling based on 
historical data and comparable titles, and an overt recognition 
of the limitations of such tools – even when individually tailored. 
The viability of such tools is evident when analysed in situ and 
framed by their users. However, unsurprisingly this level of 
understanding and recognition of incongruity is not widely 
shared. As a result odd dualities can emerge which carry over 
and blend with other imprecisions common in the literature, for 
example, false dichotomies between ‘creativity’ and ‘commerce’. 
In various formulations, many market participants use 
past performance as an indicator for forecasting future 
revenues to inform their risk mitigation practices. At the 
same time this practice is frequently disavowed in investor 
presentations and similar literature in which warnings not 
to rely on such an approach are prominent. The limitations 
of using historic data for future purposes are commonly 
acknowledged, but external participants such as non-specialist 
banks often still crave conventional calculations of risk.
There is a collective tendency towards green-lighting (or 
product acquisition) being based on optimism derived from 
achieving past ‘hits’, rather than the far more numerous 
‘misses’. This feature exists for a number of reasons. First, film 
generation decisions tend to be creatively driven by people 
with an intrinsic interest in realising the work, and extreme 
uncertainty over revenue distribution 38 not surprisingly leads 
them to accentuate the high side in order to get the project 
taken forward. Second, the unique creative attributes of 
any project likely to be considered strong with a potential 
to generate profits, are inevitably highlighted because the 
application of downside avoidance strategies is relatively 
uniform and can be more easily articulated. Given the direction 
of relative knowability – possible losses are absolute, whereas 
revenues are unbounded – calculation oriented to revenue 
generation potential tends to be more nebulous, though 
not necessarily less important in organising the market.
5.2.1 — Sales Estimates 
Sales estimates for each international territory for which 
exploitation rights are available to distributors have multiple 
uses. They range in complexity and directness in relation to 
their intended purpose. The spread of high, low and medium 
estimates, or ‘ask’ and ‘take’ prices, indicates a range of 
values for a given film as a guide for the amounts a producer 
should look for as the minimum acquisition price from a 
distributor. This informs the structuring of finance plans 
which traditionally tend to rely on pre-sales in order to help 
compose the budget alongside other debt financing. The 
value of unsold rights may be construed as an indicator of 
likely performance, or as a guide to the collateral required.
The use of sales estimates as a tool for risk management 
highlights the wide variety in the presumed accuracy of 
different sales agencies’ figures. Informal trust networks share 
sense-checking recommendations to supplement their own 
detailed performance data built up through deal volume or 
bought in from data providers. Providing confidence to other 
investors is a crucial indirect function of sales estimates. Their 
significance does not relate solely to whether an agent is likely 
to hit a certain percentage of their take estimates or not, but 
also, separately, with when the agent can make sales and 
whether the agent will be able to pay up in a timely fashion. 
Girl with a Pearl Earring, 2003, directed by Peter Webber, 
produced by Andy Paterson and Anand Tucker.
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5.2.2 — Film Tax Relief (FTR)
As a risk management tool FTR is relatively straightforward, 
but it carries complex interwoven knock-on effects. FTR 
reduces the total cost of a film to the producer. It functions 
as an incentive to stimulate business in the sector, and has 
multiplier spending effects for the economy as a whole. In 
particular, FTR has been extremely successful in attracting 
inward investment film productions to the UK 39, amounting 
to over £2bn for film and HETV in 2017 40. The contribution 
of FTR to a project typically requires cash-flowing by a 
financier, and so there are costs to accessing it, but the 
overall impact is to reduce the amount of money spent by 
the producer and thus being at risk of not being recouped.
The cash-flow function provides an opportunity for film 
financiers to add a low-risk loan strand to their business 
models. The counter-party in this context is HM Revenue & 
Customs (HMRC) and the risk of non-delivery is negligible: 
the payment of relief is dependent on administrative 
accuracy rather than the quality of the production or box 
office performance. Nonetheless FTR’s risk management 
implications spread out in multiple directions. In particular FTR 
plays a crucial role in arguably the most important industry 
tool – the finance plan and associated recoupment chart 
and the structured sharing of risk that underpins them. 
5.2.3 — The Finance Plan 
The finance plan details the investment in and ownership 
of a film, and is expressed legally through the Inter Party 
Agreement (IPA). A substantial amount of preparatory 
calculation supports the work of financing a film. This 
iterative work involves the individual project participants 
and all the negotiating parties over extended periods. 
These calculations entail the use of a recoupment chart, or 
revenue waterfall, which models the allocation of returns. 
Alongside the basic order of payment, preferential corridors 
to specific returns provide for an almost infinite variety of 
combinations of participant reward. It is vital to distinguish 
between the variety of possible participation positions in a film’s 
financial structure, and the income streams those positions 
rely upon. Some models simply require films to be made 
rather than any measure of market performance. There are 
myriad different types of risk apportioned to different types 
of finance. The most common sources of finance are ‘friends 
and family’, generally offered on non-commercial terms; trade 
finance (which may be project or slate based); and bank or 
commercial finance, which may be tax-structured. How each 
party considers risk influences their activity, and attitudes to 
risk exposure become concrete in the arrangement of the 
finance plan. Some participants are able to take a blended mix 
of positions, with capital protection sought through less risky 
positions unrelated to box office performance and the upside 
then resting with sales either directly to distributors (business-
to-business) or indirectly via distributors to end consumers.
5.2.4 — Counter-party Analysis 
Counter-party analysis as a risk management approach is 
embedded in the construction of the finance plan. The deal 
term assessment and negotiation process can be supported 
by the use of different tools that may be informed by improved 
data use so that intuition and experience are complemented by 
aggregated verifiable information. For example, the nature of 
counter-parties’ past performance is very important. However, 
quantitative expressions of previous performance are not 
necessarily probabilistic, nor always understood to be rational, 
or even always deemed appropriate in some cases, particularly 
when the market environment is changing so quickly, as for 
example with the TV markets that inform sales estimates.
What emerges from participant interviews and explanations 
of operational processes is that experience and expert 
judgement, not data collation, is most valued, but also that 
participants with the opportunity to do so will buy and collect 
data whenever possible. In particular information on discrete, 
applicable tasks or risks is sought, for example to examine 
and balance potential counter-party delinquency against the 
upside of involvement. Typically, most participants involved 
in a film will defer to the judgement of one of their number 
who they deem most informed – a kind of derived due 
diligence. The ad hoc nature of this process is rarely stated, 
and is often obfuscated by the formality of the language 
used in management analysis and investment literature. This 
can be confusing, lending authority to procedures that do 
not warrant it, and can make the sector opaque to external 
analysts. A frequent result is that these processes are effectively 
presented to investors as black boxes, so that reliance on 
track record becomes a major arbiter of future value. 
Partnership networks that contribute to the management of 
risk vary in their formality, scale and nature. Networks of various 
ties with different kinds of strength influence the organisation 
of the film industry in critical ways, impacting both on creative 
realisation 41 and casting and career paths 42. Many levels and 
dimensions of risk management practice are evident, from the 
conversational habit of information sharing amongst individual 
professionals for purposes of temperature checking on specific 
deals, to integrated business models as strategic responses 
to competition for content, demonstrated for example in slate 
co-financier agreements and output or distribution deals. 
5.2.5 — Slates / Portfolios 
Slates and portfolio approaches to risk management 
operate within more or less formal frameworks. The basic 
concept of spreading risk across a number of projects, 
rather than pursuing a single picture approach, is clear and 
commonly understood. However, when the practicalities 
of slate investment are considered and probabilistic 
approaches to decision-making are taken into account, 
the application of scientific portfolio methods to risk 
management immediately becomes more complicated 43. 
In particular, the role of time-frames in different financing 
models is crucial and impacts how various slates operate. 
The regulation of Enterprise Investment Schemes (EIS), 
mini-majors’ acquisition and release portfolios, and the 
structuring of mezzanine arrangements all impose different 
requirements on the timing of activity. The different 
perspectives of film practitioners and financial institutions 
illustrate how conceptions of risk and strategy interact. For 
example representatives of cross-FVC businesses note that 
they prefer to avoid the restrictions imposed by tax-linked 
structures and financial year ends because they do not fit 
naturally with their operational process. Respondents from 
big media companies offered contrasting evidence as to 
whether annual slate budgeting impacts their risk management 
practice throughout the year, some noting pressure on 
valuation considerations, others taking a contrary view. 
Further levels of complexity become apparent when 
considering portfolio detail: for example, definitions of 
‘slates’ vary wildly, from a handful of films to hundreds. For 
one market participant portfolio construction may be a risk 
mitigation priority, for another it might be EIS eligibility criteria 
and guidance, or the optimal dating of theatrical release. 
These differently motivated participants collide to create the 
market at any given point. As a result of this contingent set of 
arrangements and the varied allocation of relevant assets, it is 
exceptionally difficult to identify any ‘best practice’ guidelines. 
The subjective nature of risk as a business concept is 
illustrated in the UK by changes to EIS regulations, 44 in 
particular the latest risk-to-capital test defining significant risk 
as setting dependent 45. The importance of market context 
and commercial understanding has been flagged by the 
British Screen Advisory Council (BSAC) in relation to HMRC’s 
guidance on venture capital schemes generally: BSAC stresses 
consideration of “the particular risk profile of the business of 
film and TV production, but also of the various ways in which 
individual film and TV production companies may attempt to 
mitigate that risk depending on the particular circumstances.” 46
5.2.6 — Contextual Use of Industry Tools
Just as different types of finance play different roles, so 
participants do not all use the many industry tools employed 
in risk mitigation strategies in the same way all of the time; 
indeed they are not equally available to every participant. Their 
use depends on timing, competition and relative positions 
of power amongst partners. The tools can themselves form 
centres of tension revolving around estimation of likely future 
revenues and risk of financial loss. In packaging and closing 
deals, the IPA can form what sociologists call a “boundary 
object” 47, the IPA can be a location for negotiation in which 
objective assessment is balanced against other more 
subjective factors designed to influence the deal-making 
Carol, 2015, directed by Todd Haynes, produced by Elizabeth 
Karlsen, Stephen Woolley and Christine Vachon.
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process, such as film evaluation by counter-parties.
It is the combination of multiple viewpoints and multiple 
strategies that has allowed independent film-making to survive. 
However, some respondents now believe that the ongoing 
dilemmas imposed by having to rely on the pre-evaluation 
of films coupled with the radically reduced international 
market for pre-sales, is bringing matters to a head. According 
to some interviewees conditions are likely to decline into a 
state of serious threat to independent film-making: “One of 
the problems of the British film industry is that it is constantly 
trying to make films that cost more than they are worth. 
Public money can bear some of the pain of that by saying it 
is a cultural intervention effectively. If you don’t want to only 
ever have American films, then you have to put some public 
money in, that’s through the tax credits, the BFI and BBC 
and Channel 4… this very weird, compromised British model 
that you would never, if you were starting with a clear blank 
piece of paper, you would never construct it this way”. 
This analysis is increasingly shared to the point at which 
it has acquired, at least in Europe, the status of a policy 
conclusion. As EFADs noted at the end of 2017: “It is probable 
that public film funding, as a result of the fast changing 
landscape, will be required to initiate a process of rethinking 
of the fundamentals of the entire film financing system.” 48 
An alternative approach proposed by US interviewees is to 
foster greater entrepreneurialism. There is clear evidence of 
an Atlantic divide here: this was highlighted by an interviewee 
discussing the EIS as a source of finance: “EIS, obviously, 
has been very useful for the UK film industry. It’s also allowed 
some crafty companies to basically run weird businesses that 
probably shouldn’t be businesses, but we don’t have those kinds 
of tax credits”. In the US some independent producers turn to 
business angels and use credit cards. The acceptance of risk 
through personal debt in US independent film-making has 
some contrasting resonance with the very different position 
in the UK. Some critical reviews of the EIS have identified the 
dangers of allowing tax-advantaged investment structures to 
focus on capital preservation – investments that are relatively 
detached from performance risk. The new regulations and 
their accompanying guidance are explicitly designed to 
end that practice and compel investors to put their capital 
genuinely at risk – in the film industry and elsewhere. The 
impact of such changes is yet to be fully determined.
5.3 — Business Motivations and Structures
Moving to a more macro level, investigating the role of 
different market participants’ motivations, rationalisation 
processes and organisational cultures helps to contextualise 
risk approaches across company models, and in relation 
to the balance of operations through the FVC.
5.3.1 — Film Industry Risk Rationale is Complex 
and Imprecisely Expressed 
In some instances these industry characteristics can lead to 
problematic “narrow framings and sure things” 49 that incorrectly 
overstate the probability of success and provide insufficient 
framing. This can occur where forecasts are made using 
methods that eliminate extreme cases without methodological 
cause, or tools are utilised to justify executive decisions 
under the guise of predicting success. Often, management 
understanding of risk is social rather than scientific in nature.
This phenomenon can and does influence the market. Retained 
intrinsic bias can exist and infiltrate the structuring and use of 
industry tools. Such habits generally have complex, contingent 
histories, are power and value laden and may very well be 
oriented to career goals. In terms of optimistic thinking, a 
pertinent illustration is the “availability heuristic”, a way in which 
market participants may reason some state of affairs to be 
more probable than warranted by any evidence if an example 
easily comes to mind 50 (consider the recurring example of The 
King’s Speech, its dated nature and Pact’s reporting that current 
conditions make such film-making “almost impossible” 51). 
Recognition of the dominant influence of the uncontrollable 
factors and unknowable conditions on ultimate project 
performance is deeply entrenched. This leads to some film 
activity being pursued despite the absence of a business 
case. Robust, high-quality, subjective approaches that counter 
biased models of profit forecasting with reasoned, measured 
practices are typically not well or widely expressed. 
Many kinds of investment literature routinely include boilerplate 
instructions to investors not to rely on information about 
the asset or business opportunity being offered. In film this 
issue is further compounded by the use in some marketing 
documentation of problematic data sources. Much professional 
services and financial literature related to film and film trade 
commentary also generally suffers from the use of imprecise 
or inaccurate language. Even in higher-quality information 
sources and accreditation bodies’ publications, issues of 
language and depth of explanation arise. It could be argued 
that approaches to assessing potential investor upside are 
under-explained compared to the explanation of downside 
mitigation tools 52 largely because revenue forecast assumptions 
or methodologies do not tend to be in the public domain. 
5.3.2 — Motivations and Market Conditions
Extreme competition for high profile, key talent-driven 
independent films viewed as less risky by international buyers, 
is driving a trend towards FVC integration. Despite an increase 
in production volume generally, few projects are deemed to 
be at this level. The pressure on the types of film in demand, 
and their rarity, is in a way mirrored by the number of market 
participants looking at providing finance to independent film. It 
is a strange situation that there is so much international capital 
chasing a relatively limited number of high quality projects. 
For typical UK independent films there are only a handful of 
serious financiers operating. These participants generally 
operate on the basis of reasoned assessment and considerable 
operational expertise, but this has not always been true for 
all market entrants, some of whose operational models and 
motivations may have been detached from genuine industry-
based commerciality: “I am not saying they are being dishonest 
with people, I am saying they are fooling themselves more 
than anybody else. They have to believe that they are doing 
this [film involvement] for bottom line reasons…[but there is 
a] glamour discount of capital in the entertainment business… 
I think there really is. When you look at the overall economic 
return on capital, particularly in film-making, it is very hard to 
look at it and say from a risk reward standpoint that this stands 
muster with comparable investments. I explain that being the 
glamour discount. People are willing to change that risk reward 
equation in return for getting something else, and what they are 
getting is the glamour”. The results of ill-informed market activity 
on the part of some new entrants and their corresponding 
impact on industry dynamics can have negative ramifications 
for the entire industry in respect of investor perceptions.
Management cultures relating to risk interrelate not only 
with overarching business models, organisational aims and 
intentions, but also with material practice. Insights drawing 
on the Studios’ and major media companies’ work in TV 
emphasise that risk management attitudes are often tacitly 
embedded in business practice. Some are prone to inertia and 
substantially influenced by individual, cultural or organisational 
mind-sets rather than driven by impartial best practice. 
“Orthodoxies are not necessarily related to numbers, but can 
be related to conceptual origins or cultures…Decision-making 
is very personal and linked to individuals’ career paths.”
Personal job perspectives, internal power dynamics and the 
relevant participant’s position in the FVC can play a part in 
evaluation decisions. This interviewee comment is instructive 
by way of example: “The distributor will always come to an 
arrangement with the bank and the bank will always come 
to an arrangement with the distributor, within reason. They 
have sufficient alignment of their interest that they will work it 
out. The mezzanine and equity find that much more difficult.” 
The balance of power in business-to-business relations is 
one of the many factors played out on the basis of personal 
experience and expertise, as opposed to strict reliance on 
quantitatively measured or legally defined understandings. 
The notion of ‘calculated risk’ sometimes proposed in public 
and private literature is thus extremely problematic. 
The reliability of some risk mitigation procedures can be 
called into question by approaches that privilege the use 
of specified tools when convenient, whilst dismissing 
them when not helpful to pre-selected decisions.
Sales estimates for example are noted to have limited shelf lives 
and contextual relevance. Alongside whether or not estimates 
are realised in the market or not, the timing of investment 
decisions is an important variable. Another is the purpose of 
reliance upon the sales estimates, which historically has varied, 
both in the public and private sectors. From using a specific 
coverage formula to map against investments, to referencing 
estimates as a more general guidance of market interest, the 
use of estimates and other industry tools or risk management 
processes is contingent. Public funds for example, may be 
disbursed in accordance with specific directives to ignore 
commercial concerns in favour of the imperative of talent 
development. Other participants, including new and would-be 
entrants such as tech companies, may choose to behave in a 
non market-oriented manner, acting wholly outside the internal 
commercial logics of the film business. This adds to confusion 
and a general undermining of the notion of best practice. 
A variety of public and private actors with different motivations 
that may change over time and even across a single slate, 
interact in a complex ecosystem. In the public sphere some 
strategies for risk mitigation may be intrinsic to 3, 5, or 10-
year policies. Even where commercial concerns are given 
explicit prominence, as for example recently with Film4 53, 
project success cannot be entirely divorced from long-
term talent investment. A stated intent to take financially 
significant positions in substantial international films is 
one thing; being able to capitalise on a legacy of talent 
investment is quite another. At a handful of large integrated 
companies and ‘mini-majors’ extended talent investment is 
more practicable due to their scale of activity and access 
to capital. Elsewhere in the independent sector a project-
to-project focus generally, though not always, militates 
against sustained, formal long-term investment in talent.
How the risk embodied in any given film is perceived 
influences all aspects of its life, including financial its structure, 
expectations of theatrical box office and required spend 
on prints and advertising (P&A). The perception of a film as 
‘risky’ can be materialised in very different ways, from explicit 
designation within a particular genre implying it to be more 
or less likely to be popular, to attribution of a probability 
for a particular band of project financial return. In practice 
however, the evolving nature of project development and 
project realisation tends to militate against systematic 
categorisation, with the consequence that a generalised view 
of risk in film persists in most press and trade coverage.
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5.3.3 — Business Model and Company-Level Concerns 
Business model development such as vertical integration, 
alongside traditional management practices such as business 
planning, are often identified as determining components of 
risk management success at the company level. However, 
in the audiovisual sector the picture is more complex 
than simple strategy selection. As with tool adoption, not 
all strategic business options are available to all market 
participants, not least because of the absence of scale in 
the great majority of film and other content businesses. 
For those with externally-generated capital film can often 
be seen as a place to play for upside when the losses of 
involvement are affordable and when activity does not have to 
be on a business basis. In these cases such capital can purchase 
non-normal controls to act outside the logics of film business 
economics, for example working capital reserves sufficient to 
avoid financial pressure to convert projects from development 
into production, or the capacity to overpay for project access. 
Indeed when this type of market participant engages in 
production they try to do so by avoiding the inherent limitations 
of pure production models. Often they buy into complementary 
combinations of financing, sales and distribution, HETV or other 
creative industries to access more reliable revenues. The pursuit 
of notional sustainability remains in many cases externally 
linked to the idea of calculation and the increasing integration 
of marketing or audience engagement activities supports it.
In technology-led or digital distribution companies the 
application of data-led analysis is a matter of course, and 
an intrinsic, organic pursuit. However, there are barriers to 
the widespread adoption of such approaches, due either to 
lack of internal clarity about business rationale, or perhaps 
lack of resource. For instance in some companies risk 
management devices are taken to be mainly performative tools, 
demonstrating a traditional responsible approach to those 
who have no inside knowledge. In other cases the expected 
internal data sharing and data utilisation sometimes assumed 
of major media companies with cross FVC interests, is illusory.
For some large organisations data does exist and is used 
internally, but for limited purposes. Rather than mechanical 
application in a series of single decision instances, it is 
mainly used to sense check assumptions and develop 
project evaluation thinking over an extended time-frame. The 
benefits of an increased volume and transparency of data 
often hoped for by smaller companies are rarely conceived 
in this longitudinal application, instead of this assumption 
and argument support role, a Q&A response is sometimes 
conceived. Thus, it is vital that the application of more 
transparent data is considered alongside all calls for its provision.
Business model fit with risk management tools is crucial. Most 
successful audiovisual companies push back against simple 
reverse engineering as a creative or commercial process, 
highlighting its futility and self-limiting methodology: it stands 
in the way of achieving necessary innovation 54. However, 
smaller companies understandably look for alternative proxies 
for understanding and control. In another example of where 
effective sources of risk management can be obfuscated, 
the understanding and control on display in established 
operations that may come from layers of experienced 
management and large deal books, is also often accompanied 
by formal skills capabilities. Professional business planning, 
accounting, management and strategy should be employed 
across the board as common practice. Most successful 
companies largely adopt such processes, but addressing this 
issue alone will not markedly improve smaller companies’ 
business fortunes, for example by increasing access to 
finance. Although UK film companies have been criticised for 
not being able to present their business case in a language 
intelligible to traditional financiers, the level of turnover and 
growth are stronger barriers. The ‘equity gap’ issue 55 is a two-
way problem of presentation and appreciation of value.
Business and management skills and tools are necessary, but 
not sufficient conditions for success, and are understood as 
support functions, rather than as business drivers. Creativity 
struggles in an environment focused too rigidly on risk 
mitigation. There “needs to be a right to fail” but one which 
is allied with the capacity to capitalise on creativity made 
possible by knowledgeable deal-making practice plus the 
generation of reliable supplementary revenue streams. These 
might include the servicing of inward investment films, director 
/ producer career partnerships, or other complementary 
endeavours in advertising or talent management. These 
components may begin to unlock business investment 
and enable capital to be invested in IP development, thus 
contributing to improved deal structure possibilities and 
allowing for financial success to attract further investment.
“We do have some European distribution [companies] 
increasingly expressing interest in getting involved early in our 
projects and developing our projects with us because, you 
know, everyone’s desperate for product. There’s lots of product 
around but it’s hard to find good product and good material.” 
UK distribution and international demand are areas of long-
term uncertainty, but some of the specificities of the current 
market bear investigation from a risk perspective. The quote 
above relates to the global push for a narrow band of highly 
sought-after creative content, business consolidation, and the 
impending threats posed by Brexit and regulatory change in 
the EU. In addition to potential investors’ level of understanding 
of the direct drivers of approaches to risk, their reaction to 
changes in the medium-term market environment is also crucial. 
Current trends are exacerbating the underlying problems 
that form the focus of this study. Flat or declining US and 
EU theatrical admissions, decreasing EU direct consumer 
spending on films, and at the same time a higher volume of 
productions being completed, contribute to a challenging 
landscape 56. Film’s extreme polarisation of returns, increased 
competition in the flight to ‘quality’, the undermined 
international sales financing model, over-supply of under-
supported titles, challenges in cast/crew/studio access and 
audience migration to Subscription Video On Demand (SVOD) 
are all driving the industry towards the greater integration of 
business models, vertically (distribution and production) and 
horizontally (film and HETV), and in broader digital sectors.
This trend is not universally seen as a panacea to the industry’s 
problems: “That is why so much diversification is going on, and 
the change I have seen is so many companies going: ‘Well we 
have got to get into TV because we are not going to survive 
otherwise, how are we going to get any IP, how are we going 
to get a basket of rights that is going to provide us with some 
royalties because working on the classic old fashioned broken 
production fees model…we have to give away the majority of our 
fees because we have to close the gap and so we have not ended 
up with anything left.’ That is such a cliché but it still happens 
every day.” Successful independent film business models are 
often multi-faceted, developed over time, and exploit market 
niches. Certain combinations of finance, service provision, and 
rights creation and exploitation can work very well, but require 
scale to achieve commercial sustainability, which is rarely found. 
The attractions of TV and now HETV, including more stable 
pipelines, the potential for building an asset base and clear 
route to exit due to the standardised norms of retained rights 
ownership, attract more new entrants and more conventional 
finance than the more speculative business of producing films.
However, despite the sentiments of some market participants 
successfully moving to TV and largely abandoning the world 
of film, there is also a consensus in both the independent and 
Studio camps that the two media are substantially different 
and that few who make the transition will succeed. The 
anticipated success of hybridised companies is associated 
with their opportunistic, organic development driven by the 
creative content itself, rather than by an explicit switch in their 
business strategies. Indeed, access to the highlighted benefits 
of the TV model is receding. HETV content co-produced or 
originating elsewhere and the SVOD cost-plus model bring 
the financing (and IP ownership) model closer to independent 
film. A threat has been identified that the UK TV sector could 
in future mirror the film business with small, innovative 
companies effectively being overshadowed by a sector 
essentially focused on servicing inward investment business 57.
Investment in UK TV companies is continuing, including from 
international federalist TV distribution entities – the largely 
foreign owned ‘super-indies’ buying into innovative domestic 
producers, but it is noted that few British independent drama 
producers of scale remain in British ownership 58. On the TV 
project side the potential incremental upside compared to a 
blockbuster hit film is comparatively limited. However, research 
6 — Market Environment Uncertainty: Future-
Oriented and Macro-Level Considerations
This section provides an overview of how current trends and 
uncertainties in the wider marketplace for film are affecting the 
way in which companies consider and approach risk.
Girl with a Pearl Earring, 2003, directed by Peter Webber, 
produced by Andy Paterson and Anand Tucker.
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participants also commented on the poor quality of most 
film proposals looking for finance, and this is considered to 
perpetuate negative relative perceptions of the film industry. 
Stereotypes referring to the core characteristics of the business 
play out surprisingly often, for example in relation to non-market 
investor perspectives: “They kind of rationalise to themselves to 
some extent as to why film investment might make more sense 
than it really does, they tell themselves they are doing it strictly 
for bottom line purposes…you are looking at the investment 
that they are making and the risk reward components that you 
have, and I realise that if it was a plumbing company in St Louis 
with the same risk reward components they would not touch it.” 
When film businesses are successful, they are not required to 
divulge their inner workings. Investors do not generally conduct 
an audit when things are going well, and as few UK companies 
are scaled sufficiently to enable them to pursue institutional 
finance, disclosure is limited. Thus, information about high-
quality operations is hard to come by, whereas general surface-
level commentary and often damning sector data is plentiful. 
It is an open question whether greater industry data 
transparency would make the sector more attractive to a 
larger number of external finance sources and improve overall 
access to finance. For example, fuller information about the 
fundamental dynamics of revenue distribution and the threats 
imposed by the continued disruption of oligopolistic internet 
service providers and content aggregators possessing direct 
to consumer (D2C) data and relationships, may not appear 
enticing. The general notion that (more) complete information 
would lead to greater investor confidence and thus similar 
treatment to any other business sector, is simplistic and 
based on incomplete and flawed analysis. Pure information, 
that is to say data, is not the same as operational knowledge. 
Without the capacity to take advantage of new insights 
anticipated sector benefits are unlikely to be significant. 
From the perspective of some internal market participants, 
the current broader market environment adds a further 
disincentive to reassessing existing business practices. Sticking 
to what you know based on hard-won core competencies is 
deemed by some to be a safer strategy in disruptive times.
7.1 — Identifying and Addressing the 
Industry Knowledge Gap
There is a lack of clear, detailed, high-quality information about 
the film industry. This refers not only to the oft-cited lack of 
revenue and profitability data, but also to information about the 
way in which film project characteristics are evaluated, projects 
accessed, and financial involvement in films structured. How the 
industry is perceived impacts how it operates. This knowledge 
gap likely contributes to a lack of investor confidence and 
therefore contributes to difficulties in accessing finance. It also 
creates challenges for the generation of evidence-based policy.
7.1.1 — Institutional Accreditation / Recognition 
for Industry Information Provision
The operational rationale of the film industry is complex 
and often imprecisely expressed. The language, practices, 
instruments and biases pertaining to risk in film give rise 
to misunderstanding and disengagement. Professional 
financial services reports, financial literature and trade 
commentary often suffer from a lack of clarity, sometimes 
replicated within the sector itself. These issues all contribute 
to a general sense of financial marginality. Pact notes that 
production companies are starved of critical investment, 
which limits growth and global competitiveness 59.
In many areas the industry lacks stable, regulated hallmarks of 
quality. The recognition of, and institutional accreditation of, 
certain core building blocks of industry information, meaning 
useful data-sets and worked examples of recommended 
practice, for example in industry accounting, could help 
address this problem. Public bodies like the former UK Film 
Council and the British Film Institute (BFI) have historically set 
out support for particular film finance initiatives such as FTR 
or EIS, they also grant accreditation to certain schemes or 
practices. Starting with specific reference to the concept of 
risk, and the means by which it is managed, and by refining 
and articulating their own definitions, positions, processes and 
provision of information, public and private organisations could 
work together to lead on delivering a number of empirically 
grounded initiatives so as to counter this knowledge deficit.
Access to finance reports regularly propose better liaison 
between financial bodies and the creative industries in 
general. The provision of trusted expert information, for 
example on investment methodology, could be a first step 
on a path to potential long-term positive change for the 
film industry. There may be a role here for the new Policy 
and Evidence Centre (PEC) to be established by the AHRC, 
as well as the DCMS, the BFI, BSAC and the accounting 
bodies. This is for discussion amongst stakeholders, but 
formal accreditation will be essential to build confidence. 
7.1.2 — Appropriately Resourced Data Analysis 
A lack of reliable market data is regularly noted as a cause 
of under-capitalisation in the independent film sector. It is 
important not only that data be validated but that its use be 
appropriate. Currently there is a lack of data sharing across 
industrial agency silos and organisations, and the potential of 
using the information such organisations collect as a matter 
of course, such as finance plans and budgets for market 
schemes and certification processes, is under-exploited. 
A lack of dedicated resources for analysis and a lack of 
commonly-recognised data handling standards holds back 
advances in the use of data, as does an absence of common 
recognition for the viability of analysis for particular tasks. This 
general state of affairs stands in stark contrast with Chinese 
film industry data integration 60, and leading activity in the 
global exhibition sector and other creative industries 61.
Data analysis innovation could be maximised in specific areas 
of demonstrable impact, such as audience identification 
between distribution and exhibition. The terminology, 
process, and strategy of public organisations should 
be linked with processes used to measure and manage 
progress towards related goals – for example, in assessing 
how film businesses might demonstrate how they can 
become ‘sustainable’, or take ‘calculated risks’, or indeed 
replace these concepts. The leveraging of evaluative data 
for the benefit of the sector should be considered. 
Riskiness is often given as a reason to persist with the 
status quo and, for example, to avoid diversity in talent 
representation 62. Without the evidence base for change 
inertia in all areas, including business models, will persist. 
Lack of data also closes off current practice to proper scrutiny 
and analysis. Many characteristics of risk mitigation at the 
industry level militate against innovation and diversity of 
creative expression, for example the pursuit of a ‘bankable 
cast’ or material deemed acceptable to international 
audiences through the filter of derived demand. 
It is important to identify where better data, and better use of 
data can help. As the BFI recognised in calling for a specific 
stream of Government work in 2015 on the right policies 
to build companies of scale 63, serious attention is required 
to explore the best data analysis options long-term. This 
requires a (currently absent) empirically-led resource for data 
analysis – as recommended by the Warwick Commission 64 
possibly linked to the new AHRC PEC or similar centres of 
expertise. Through such work, data use can be oriented toward 
instances where unhelpful, entrenched infrastructural norms 
can be challenged and value created. Clearly foreseeable 
benefits to map alongside the more certain costs of change 
are vital. It is also important, alongside the consideration of 
what kind of data would enable greater access to finance, 
to consider the potential deployment of such capital.
7 — Findings and Proposals
The key findings of the research are outlined in this section, along 
with a number of interlinked proposals for improving analysis 
and the further consideration of risk in the film industry. 
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For an example of how aggregated data analysis could be of 
benefit at the industry level, consideration should be given 
to the potential role of centralised data and expertise. So, for 
instance, this could enable collaboration with the capacity-
building operation of European Commission’s Cultural 
and Creative Sectors’ Guarantee Facility (CCSGF). Public 
organisations could look to work with the CCSGF to examine 
how data and analysis provision might be pulled together 
across international markets and either extend provision to 
the UK or underpin a proxy service. The French Institut pour le 
Financement du Cinéma et des Industries Culturelles (IFCIC) 
provides specialised expertise to lenders in the evaluation of 
creative propositions 65. The ability to smartly leverage such 
available information is crucial to exploiting opportunities in the 
independent sector 66. Systemic investigation of the impacts of 
capped upside deals (SVOD) replacing incremental sales (DVDs) 
could be examined and responsive business models developed. 
7.1.3 — Combination of High-Quality Information 
with Official Direction on / Consolidation 
of Accounting Standards Best Practice
Leadership by Government and public organisations is further 
required for (the regularly recommended 67) consolidation of 
– and direction on – accounting standards. This is inherently 
linked to access to finance, as difficulty in valuing film companies 
is typically presented as a key challenge for banks and larger 
investors. This is neither an easy nor a UK-specific issue. 
In the US the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
states the need for specific businesses to present tailored risk 
factors regarding their operations and avoid using unhelpful 
boilerplate language 68. Robust and sector-specific guidelines 
respecting the complexity and diversity of film business models 
would assist companies and investors 69.
While the challenge of effectively 
communicating the nature of risk and 
approaches to its mitigation is pervasive, 
there are areas for potential progress. 
These include considering how best to 
capture the value of talent networks and 
investment in development. These challenges 
require expertly-advised accounting 
measures to be devised, standardised and 
explained for wider industry benefit. 
7.2  — Putting Knowledge to Work
Once aggregated and qualified market 
data and processes have been validated, 
the potential for applied data innovation 
can be realised. Data accrues at different 
times and places along the FVC 70, 
and is rarely systematically combined, 
analysed or shared. Through-lines of 
data-led work at larger companies with 
requisite data access are currently inhibited by different 
department team specialisms, inertia or human resource 
legacies, whereas independents do not have access to 
the appropriate data or the resources required to use it. 
7.2.1 — Distribution / Exhibition – Marketing Efficiency 
and Audience Reach Models Informed 
by Logics of Global Leading Practice
Although some extrapolated end goals of initiatives such 
as Sundance’s Transparency Project give an over-estimated 
illusion of control (the laudable enterprise to increase 
revenue and audience data sharing was heralded by some 
as a panacea to project uncertainty), there are potential 
benefits to increased data provision. Most notably, benefits 
are proposed in audience marketing efficiencies through 
collaboration across the FVC, especially between distribution 
and exhibition. It is in these areas of discrete tasks such 
as audience segmentation and film release dating that 
technology-led approaches to risk may apply 71. Application to 
a contested windows marketplace where a better-understood 
and actively engaged cinema audience has been developed, 
could help reduce elements of uncertainty for new products.
At the industry level, consumer rejection of periods of enforced 
darkness and artificial scarcity are driving a need to build 
different business models, hence the increase of day-and-
date releasing and SVOD uptake. Data efficiencies will likely 
play a role in any premium VOD windowing or new direct 
to consumer SVOD models, for instance in sliding revenue 
split calculations. Implementation of such innovations may 
aim to employ the logics of Chinese social media ticketing 
apps, examples of which have integrated data analytics from 
distribution and exhibition and reversed into production and 
finance based on direct audience understanding and access. 
7.2.2 — Facilitating Efficiencies in Contracting 
and Payment to Replace Balance of 
Power Network Reliance and Potentially 
Improve Investor Confidence
Applications of computation on cross-FVC data sets are 
not limited to marketing. The multiple impacts of HETV 
and SVOD success generate specific challenges. There 
are macro considerations such as growing concerns 
of a bubble, or that TV may become like film – a ‘mere 
adjunct’ of US companies, dependent on foreign capital, 
addressing a globalised viewership 72. There are also business 
model concerns centring on the constriction of home 
entertainment viewership into the SVOD window which 
limits overall incremental sales of films and thus undermines 
the unbounded upside of hits and attendant company 
impacts of steady longitudinal income from library titles.
Innovative applications of technology could be explored to 
address such issues, potentially firstly by ensuring all extant 
systems are as effective as possible and enable successes 
to be maximised. One example is the need for more efficient 
tools and processes in closing finance, in part to facilitate 
flexibility of workflow as windows of talent availability 
emerge. Exploring smart, private contracts for closing 
finance and executing payment based on revenue reporting; 
and other distinct areas of more transparent management, 
can begin to replace balance of power network reliance 
and thereby potentially improve investor confidence.
7.2.3 — Facilitating Improvements in IP Valuation 
Linked to the need to capitalise on existing repositories of 
data mentioned above, a wealth of budget and finance plan 
information resides in different public organisations’ application 
and certification databases. Exploring how to harness this 
data, whilst recognising the technological, ethical, commercial 
and practical application challenges, is a key task. This 
work can inform future business model development by for 
instance improving SVOD revenue assessment evaluation.
7.2.4 — Leadership on the Use of Innovative 
Technological Approaches 
Technology and management models in other creative 
industries provide templates to learn from in the adoption of 
innovation partnerships and in the opportunities potentially 
afforded by innovative technology such as blockchain 
architecture and shared computational analysis. The Open Music 
Initiative (OMI) 73, a cross-industry public/private partnership, 
could further inspire such innovation in film. Their approach is 
ground-up and very long-term, starting from simple building 
blocks to get necessary market participants on board. The OMI 
started with identifying a Minimum Viable Data & Metadata 
package for a song as a point to build upon. The potential 
implications for addressing issues such as the analysis of 
pooled anonymous data, or networked trust to formalise the 
derived due diligence currently operational only via separate 
industry tools is worth pursuing. Steps can be taken by exploring 
potential decentralised data marketplaces such as Enigma 
where data might be appropriately valued and computation 
may be effected on confidential, encrypted data at the point 
of use 74. Progress in this field requires industry leadership.
7.3 — Addressing the Overarching Conditions of Work 
In addressing both new problems including funding loss and/
or uncertainty due to Brexit, potential territoriality collapse, 
and tech sector disruption, and older persistent issues such 
as the extremes of revenue distribution, the nature of how 
different market participants are able to engage with the 
sector is important. Often, access to successful conditions 
or resources for reorganising involvement in the FVC to a 
given market participant’s benefit relies upon an ability to 
act outside the logics and constraints internal to the system. 
As a result, it is very difficult to outline fully transparent 
pathways to involvement in the film industry that are attractive 
and driven by intrinsic characteristics of the business. 
It is important that any interventions recognise these market 
conditions and focus support on those market participants 
that are forced to play the game by its own internal rules. 
Independent companies’ successful realisation of film 
projects should accrue advantages, for example of financial 
returns, knowledge building, networked access to assets 
and so on. Independent film businesses should not be 
starting from scratch with every project every time.
Market participants noted the success of initiatives such as the 
Producer Equity Corridor (PEC) and Producer Equity Entitlement 
(PEE), fee and overhead protection and revenue locked boxes. 
When considering what further initiatives might support the 
generation of felicitous conditions such that success may be 
rewarded and reinvested, it is crucial that all potential knock-on 
effects of intervention are modelled. For example, in relation to 
an increased tax credit of 40%, as called for by Pact 75, what are 
the potential implications regarding producers’ interaction with 
financiers that typically cashflow FTR alongside other provisions? 
Measures to improve the position of UK film businesses must be 
cumulative and complementary. Access to capital is one step, 
being able to put that capital to work appropriately is another. 
7.3.1 — Exploration of (Tax Advantaged) Cross-FVC 
R&D Support for Content Businesses 
Development was the FVC segment most regularly cited 
by research participants as the locus in which prospective 
value can most effectively be generated relative to 
intervention cost. Instances of extra public financial 
resources provision have helpfully been used as working 
capital for increased or diversified development spending, 
usually deployed in extra staffing or rights acquisition costs. 
This is as opposed to direct provision of producers’ equity 
investment in their own films – the typical lack of which 
limits access to revenues high up the recoupment chart.
Suffragette, 2015, directed by Sarah Gavron, 
produced by Alison Owen and Faye Ward.
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Development is where unmediated risk 
often lies. New entrants including FAANG 
(Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google) 
type companies were noted as tending not 
to invest in it, choosing rather to acquire 
finished content of known quality. This 
destabilises the overarching FVC architecture 
which relies on scaled investment in 
development and production upfront such 
that hits have a chance to emerge. 
To address this shift in production involvement 
and value capture, which is perceived to be 
disproportionate by some UK incumbents, a re-
examination of development support, especially 
that which might encourage scale of budget 
and correlative release, would be advantageous. 
Scale of project ambition inherently interacts 
with budgetary dynamics, audience reach 
and distribution requirements and these 
connections illustrate the different dimensions 
of risk at play. Interviewees highlighted the need 
to get above a threshold (if unknown) status of 
scale 76 sufficient to break out, and to compete 
with other entertainment forms. This is deemed 
vital in order for a film to stand a chance of 
delivering meaningful revenues sufficient to 
help distribution and production companies 
to progress toward sustainability. The pursuit 
of this aim requires support at the base of the 
industry pyramid (the notional nationwide 
virtual studio 77), which is development.
Nesta assesses the recognition of R&D as a 
legitimate practice in the arts, arguing that 
creative experimental development meets 
the systematic work requirement needed 
for public support 78. This area is becoming 
increasingly pertinent as an innovation 
issue, as technology / services companies 
which also produce content for film, VR, and 
games, cannot access this kind of support 
to help produce content – which is utterly 
vital to the ecosystem. Tech-sector thinking 
is also promoted in the industry with regard to consideration 
of financial arrangements, with examples given of the Silicon 
Valley VC model in which investors accept that producers 
who deliver success should own a substantial portion of 
their work, even if they have not provided equity 79.
An R&D initiative could provide an avenue for flexible 
interaction to involve distributors, reflecting the competitive 
pressure that drives distributors’ earlier project engagement, 
but also encourage increased threshold levels of scale – in 
production and release. Pact advances its economic logic 
of increased FTR to 40% having a sector-level impact by 
noting it would enable producers to “roll the dice more 
often” and that “one or two additional hits will have a colossal 
impact” 80. A view was expressed that not only are more 
opportunities needed (that is to say projects), but that they 
also need to be at an appropriately high scale of quality.
This research did not provide consensus on investment 
arrangements or business models involving tax wrap-arounds. 
Several successful businesses note the inherent problems of 
such interventions leading to the tail wagging the dog and on 
occasion the undermining of business processes, including the 
ability to manage risk according to intrinsic creative properties, 
rather than timetabling for allocating investment in a given tax 
year, to take one example. Additionally, it was noted that EIS 
arrangements, while a valuable source of project finance, have 
not in the main produced sustainable, growing businesses. 
Thus, any new initiative should focus on addressing exploitation 
loopholes and driving a case for business building with 
potential knock-on impacts for retention of taxable revenues.
7.3.2 — Policy Focus on Developing Umbrella Support 
at the Business Level by Engaging Inward 
Investment Companies and Infrastructure
“How we can translate the volume of [inward investment] 
work coming in and the work it is providing into longer 
term sustainable benefit for people coming up now, 
and people who want to establish creative business 
and work in the UK?…. inward investment has to be part 
of that mix, not regarded somehow as a threat.”
Another area of mixed industry viewpoints relates to the costs 
and benefits of inward investment growth to the independent 
film sector 81. The decrease of mid-budget independent film-
making is recognised as a barrier to talent development. The 
complex relations between inward investments’ pump primer 
utility, talent escalator role, and the industry’s wish to avoid 
functioning purely as a service industry require mapping out 
more precisely. “Film in the UK is booming and the role of 
the BFI is to ensure that independent film – the incubator of 
creativity – flourishes in this environment.” 82 If the UK industry 
is to continue to function (though hopefully not solely) as 
an incubator, then there is a clear requirement to provide 
the protection and nourishment necessary so that the UK 
industry can succeed for itself, and for the global industry.
Identifying the best collaborative cross-benefit framework for 
inward investment and domestic film-making, was noted as a 
key priority for some important public organisations. For specific 
investigation is the role that inward investment infrastructure 
could play in supporting UK businesses. Across the world, the 
benefits of large-scale film-making, especially on technological 
companies that are then able to move into film creation and 
rights exploitation, are evident. How might similar benefits 
be derived for companies in other FVC positions? Could 
movement of talent from independent to Studio projects be 
reciprocated with corporate benefits, for example the provision 
of commercial advice and services, potentially improved access 
to finance by underwriting a percentage of loans, facilitation 
of access to over-subscribed talent, crew and studio space? 
The value of business skills and their formal expression was an 
issue of contention amongst different research participants. 
Some public organisations, investors, and some producers, as 
well as much access to finance literature, cite the lack of ability 
to demonstrate traditional business management practices as 
a barrier to company and sector development. Contrastingly, 
numerous extremely successful practitioners view business 
planning as intrinsically unhelpful and thus, often a waste of 
time. Some instrumental uses are accepted, such as for investor 
reassurance, but research participants often highlighted 
the core fallibility of the tool in the film business context.
This example points to a wider trend. When the underlying 
dynamics of the industry mean that there is high likelihood of 
failure of the overall project, or at least the very high likelihood of 
no control over the eventual outcome, the cost-benefit analysis 
of engaging in formal management activity (largely predicated 
on different industries) is unattractive to independents. 
This leads to circumspection when it comes to change for 
example in new data-led model adoption, especially if market 
participants are already successful in navigating complexity in 
some respects and can see definite gains in focussing on their 
existing core competencies, such as creative development.
Linking skills development to demonstrable, larger infrastructure 
and industry benefits may therefore be a productive strategy – 
one that could be embedded in creative clusters. For example, 
there is a knowledge gap in traditional film businesses in 
applying cohort analysis 83 to audience data, which is becoming 
increasingly prevalent as tech-led distribution companies 
further integrate across the FVC. This expertise exists in-house 
at larger, advanced (usually international) companies and 
education or service provision could form part of umbrella links 
between international and domestic industry participants. While 
keeping in mind there will be limitations to the proposition, 
there are still certainly benefits in training to speak the same 
language and negotiate in the same currency across the FVC.
 
Carol, 2015, directed by Todd Haynes, produced by Elizabeth 
Karlsen, Stephen Woolley and Christine Vachon.
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8.1 — About ICCE
ICCE delivers entrepreneurship, cultural management 
and policy education to the creative and cultural sectors, 
and supports research into new approaches to business, 
financial models and policy and management in the Creative 
Economy. It delivers a range of academic programmes and 
presents activities and events to promote an environment 
in which creative and cultural entrepreneurship can flourish. 
Our approach is to integrate entrepreneurship and new 
management, within the development of creative practices, 
and to take a creative approach to the development of new 
businesses and the infrastructure that supports them.
Goldsmiths’ reputation as a leading provider of creative 
education, and its longstanding engagement with cultural 
practice and analysis, make it the ideal home for ICCE. 
Engagement with the creative industries and the not-for-profit 
cultural sector has long existed across many of Goldsmiths’ 
academic departments and research centres. What makes ICCE 
different is its interdisciplinarity. Artistic creativity increasingly 
blurs the old boundaries of subject disciplines such as music, 
drama, dance, fine art, design, communications, media and 
technology. ICCE serves as an area for experimentation, 
where all of these disciplines can come together to learn 
from each other and to develop new creative alliances.
ICCE’s diversity of engagement goes beyond the academic 
disciplines. ICCE also engages directly with external partners 
from the creative industries and from other specialist higher 
education institutions. Some of our partners are actively 
involved in curriculum development or in providing training 
opportunities, whilst others act in an advisory capacity. 
Through their direct engagement, all of them ensure that 
ICCE’s courses and other activities address the priorities and 
needs of the growing creative and cultural sector itself.
8.2 — References and Further Information
Further methodological details and reference  
information, including links to digital sources  
are available at www.filmriskresearch.com. 
Images provided courtesy of Ingenious Media 
Anonymous quotes are not footnoted.
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